It is necessary to discover and develop the new subject, i.e. our subject. It is necessary to rethink our problems, and not only European problems. Develop new categories. Ask new questions, and develop new answers, that Europe cannot develop, because their problems are different.
Enrique Dussel invites me in through the black gates that lead to his office at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma Mexicom. I am 45 minutes late but he wants to put time aside for me despite my delay. “You have come all the way from Pakistan after all,” he says. “It would be a shame if we did not speak.”
His office has a library that looks like his mind: Eclectic and disciplined. He is a voracious reader of philosophy from across the world, almost as if his person does not recognize boundaries of thought. The books that he has written cover an entire wall, all bound in identical black leather with titles engraved in gold. “My compiled writings,” Dussel explains. He has channeled his engagements into his thinking and his pen, and produced a collection of work that has inspired generations of philosophy students, activists, and political groups, in Mexico and beyond.
Dussel is one of the most grounded and innovative political philosophers alive today. He is the author of more than 50 books, and written extensively about everything from political philosophy and ethics, to theology, aesthetics, and ontology. As one of the founders of the Philosophy of Liberation, he approaches his areas of thought from his position as a thinker in the Global South. His experience as a young boy in Mendoza, Argentina, the son of a country doctor, played a defining role in his life. His interaction with poor rural families, voluntary work with disabled children, and political activism as a teenager constituted his intellectual discourse, paving the way–along with so many other experiences–towards the man that he is today. Perhaps that is why his background is precisely the place that he starts, as I sit down to speak to him, to ask him about his person, and his philosophy.
Mahvish Ahmad (MA): You describe yourself first and foremost as a philosopher. Could you explain the role of the philosopher and of philosophy?
Enrique Dussel (ED): For me, philosophy was first and foremost the discovery of what it means to be a philosopher in Latin America.
As an 18 year old, I chose to study at the Faculty of Philosophy. During my time, a Bachelor was 10 semesters, or five years, long. I first studied in Argentina, but left for Mexico where I was in exile through the Argentinian military dictatorship of 1975. At this point, the study of philosophy in Argentina was Eurocentric. We studied Greek philosophy, Latin, the middle ages, etc. So studying philosophy in Argentina was the same as studying in Madrid, Paris or Berlin.
At the age of 23, I received a stipend to pursue a post-graduate doctorate in philosophy in Spain. It was at this point that I discovered that I was not a European, but a Latin American. And, then, I didn't know what happened. I spent a total of 10 years in Europe. After Madrid, I went to Sorbonne in Paris, and Germany for two years. I went to Israel, the Mediterranean, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Greece, and so on.
[Dussel picks up “The Politics of Liberation: A Critical Global History”, the first of his mammoth 3-volume work laying out the foundations of a decolonized political philosophy]
This book is the first of its kind, mapping out Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Philosophy from the 13th Century until the year 2000. It is 1100 pages long, and each page has two columns. I inspired the book, but more than 60 colleagues have collaborated in its production. This is the first history of philosophy in Latin America. It was published in 2010, and nothing of its kind has ever existed.
Thinking as a Latin American philosopher has been a very difficult struggle. The academia, and its university professors, have mostly been Eurocentric.
I started when I came back from Europe and discovered popular struggles. We started thinking of the history of Latin American philosophy, from the point of view of the oppressed. An approach that is so characteristic of Liberation Philosophy, the only new school of thought born in Latin America. All other schools, Marxist, phenomenology, American pragmatism, etc., are all commentaries of Europe or the United States.
So to answer your question, for me philosophy is to think, to critique in a radical manner, against the foundational moment of domination. The oppressed constitute the majority in the periphery, the South and the old colonies. Modern philosophy is bourgeois. Consciously or unconsciously, this philosophy justifies imperialism, bourgeoise, capitalism, eurocentrism. Domination has a last philosophical moment. We build a critique against this foundational moment so the oppressed people can become free. That, for me, is the function of philosophy. It is a critique of the status quo.
MA: How does the philosopher, the intellectual, play a role within this critique?
ED: First, through the deconstruction of the history of philosophy. Europeans believe and lay claim to being the universal philosophy. Descartes is the beginning of modern philosophy. And modern philosophy is a world philosophy.
We say “No, hold on a moment!” Modern European philosophy is a European philosophy. It is true that European countries like France or England become, especially after the industrial revolution, empires of their time. And that all other cultures were more or less dominated as colonies.
Understanding their philosophy, European philosophy, as provincial, which it is, is not easy for us. We are of the conviction that Hegel and Marx are for all worlds, and not philosophers of the central moment of world history.
It is necessary to discover and develop the new subject, i.e. our subject. It is necessary to rethink our problems, and not only European problems. Develop new categories. Ask new questions, and develop new answers, that Europe cannot develop, because their problems are different. After this exercise, we can perhaps look at the categories of European philosophy, and see if they are relevant.
But let me also bring in something else that is interesting.
Let me bring in the beginning of the Philosophy of Liberation. They are a group of philosophers in Argentina in the 1960s who arose during military dictatorship and oppression. There were very interesting popular movements in Argentina in the '60s. The '68 of Argentina or Mexico is not the '68 or Paris or Berkeley. Ours was very different. Here in Mexico, '68 was Tlatelolco. During a repressed student and workers movement the government massacred more than 400 in the Tlatelolco section of Mexico City. In Paris and Berkeley, not one person was killed. Here, more than 400 died. In Argentina, students and workers took control of a city, Cordoba. We call it “The Cordobazo”, or “The Big Cordoba”, and it sought to challenge the dictator, Ongania's, power.
Political engagement is very strong in our countries, and we have a very strong and popular political sensibility. The “popular” is a very difficult subject in Europe or the United States. There people think Hitler, folk and folkgeist, they think rightist groups. But in Latin America, the people signify dignity, and the poor. They're all Indians, Afro-Americans, and workers, the marginalized. The “people” have another meaning for us.
The same goes for the state. Antonio Negri in Empire said the state is not important. The question is empire, and empire has no relation with the state. But for us, in post-colonial countries, the state is very important. Because the state can defend us from the presence of world capitalism. So, we have many different visions not just on the political, but also of the ethical.
The ethical liberation I developed is not a consensual ethics like Habermas. I needed a material ethics of the affirmation of life, the corporality of life. Because, for the poor, poverty is a problem, whether you are in Pakistan, India, or Latin America. For us, poverty is a problem.
But what does it mean to be poor?
I discovered Marx not as a Marxist. I discovered Marx as a means to understand what it means to be poor. Being poor not on the individual, moral, or abstract level, but in the economical, the geopolitical, and the historical sense. To discover the poor as “other”, in the sense of Emmanuel Levinas, a French philosopher, is different than the “other” in Levinas himself. When I spoke with Levinas, he didn’t understand why we found his thought so interesting. Because, for us, the first problem wasn't exteriority, but poverty.
The trouble is that our problems are not very well represented in North American or European philosophy. We have other questions. For example, the alienation of the colonial culture of the old colonies. We have a tradition, and this tradition was the annihilated, oppressed because of the exploitation by European culture. We have a dichotomy here, that the European does not understand. The European does not understand what it means to confront these questions. He has no idea what all our questions mean, because our situation is very different: To be colonial.
For example, I read Parmenides, who said the being is what the non-being is not. For a European it is almost an abstract tautology. But, when I read the Greek philosopher, I understood that the being is Greek, and the non-Greek is the non-being. The barbarian, the asiatic, the other people outside the city walls. Heraklitus said the logos is until the wall of the city, after the wall is the multitude. But, this multitude is an asiatic multitude, the non-being, the non-human. So, I understand this from the point of view of the coloniality of being. I understand it in the other way. All Greek, feudal and even Islamic philosophy–because even in Islamic philosophy there is a sense of who is Islamic (Dar-ul-Islam) and who is not Islamic (Dar-ul-Harb)–advocates the negativity of the other. The problem is that I am that other.
In the first lecture I gave in the United States, I said, “For you Latin America is not civilized, developed, human. It is not. When I speak of my country, I speak of the non-being, of a barbarian philosophy.” I begin with a text of Athenagoras in the 2nd century. He was not a Roman, and spoke on the barbarian philosophy of the Roman people. I can reread the Roman and understand what it means to be the barbarian of the European. I introduce a new, and actual, subject into European philosophy.
For North Americans, to be a Mexican is to be illegal in the United States. And to be illegal is to be a second human being. It is a racist category, indicating that Parmenides is still at work today. The being is Anglo-Saxon, the non-being, the non-human, is non-Anglo-Saxon, whom we can kill, no problem. Take Iraq, one Iraqi is not a problem. We can kill hundreds and thousands of persons, but the 25 boys are a problem. The American is paramount.
A sensitivity to this, an attempt to critique this, is developed in a Philosophy of Liberation.
MA: How does one go about decentering such a dominant discourse?
ED: Many things come to mind.
This is a small book, “The Philosophy of Liberation.” It is like a meta-discourse.
There are abstract categories. All categories in the social science e.g. in anthropology, sociology, history, politics, etc. have abstract categories.
We can speak on the totality; a system. But what does totality mean? A system? What does it mean when somebody in the exteriority of the system is subsumed and alienated in the system? And how can somebody recoup the dignity of the system, and organize a new system? And put the system into question? All these are abstract categories. I call them meta-categories. It is logic.
The Philosophy of Liberation begins to be a logic. But afterwards, on the basis of this logic, I construct a politics, an ethics and an aesthetics, many things. At this point, I operate on a more empirical level. For example, the question of gender at an erotic level, woman/man. I can develop a treatise on the liberation of woman based on the categories I develop in the philosophy of liberation. And confront issues like psychoanalysis.
But on these levels, the question of modernity always plays a role. And in modernity, central and peripheral countries now begin to be in question. Because, now, at this moment, the centrality of Europe and the United States begins to change. The presence of China and India begins to be more developed. Russia discovers a new possibility. And the new poles of presence, where the center is not Europe, United States, and Japan, like some years ago, begin to be a pluripolarity–if I can call it that.
Now, it's more difficult to see many relations on this geopolitical level. But this moment is still interesting. China, for example, begins to be more present at all levels. They also begin a discovery through their own philosophy. Because, Marxism said the old culture was a bourgeois, monarchic mix–nothing. But now, the Chinese begin to discover that there is an old Chinese culture. They begin to discover tradition, to understand what China means. China is not a miracle. It has developed over 2000 years of civilization. Each of these big cultures have begun to discover their traditions, and have begun a dialogue with modernity. They have philosophical questions that we must put into the discussion. That, generally speaking, Europeans don't put into the question, or into the discussion.
MA: You speak of de- and re-structuring philosophy. Could you give another example of when you take existing canonical political philosophy and de-structure it? Could you give me a specific example of a thinker where you think this is necessary?
ED: For example, for me, within political philosophy, ethics is the abstract foundation of all practical fields. Economics is a practical field, as is family, culture, and, of course, politics. That is why I needed to develop an ethics of liberation. I began to study political philosophy to clarify this foundational moment for myself, the foundational moment of all practical fields.
For me, the question lay in our practice. And in the last 12 years, Latin America has had very interesting political experiences, or practices. We have a long history of politics, and in books, I clarify this history. To understand where I am in Latin America. But, it was not like this in the past. So in 1999, for example, the revolution was not so strong. This was when Hugo Chavez began the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.
I focused on the left, or rather, center-left, not the far left. There was a small left... Nevertheless, it was a novelty, because all our governments were right-wing military dictatorships, or populist like the Congress Party in India. Now, they have moved more to the left.
I began to study the experience in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and other countries. And for me, it was revolutionary. The manner in which the Zapatista movement began to speak on politics. For me, it was very original. They think politics like Indian groups, and they express themselves through a man who writes very well, Subcommandante Marcos. He is a philosopher. He studied at the same university where I am a professor. He was a professor there too, and he was 4 semesters junior to me! Afterwards, he went to Chiapas. He is a philosopher, but he engages with the Indians. And he has a very beautiful, very clear, manner of writing.
He has produced an expression which is very interesting. It is in Spanish, and it is untranslatable (intraductible) from Spanish. ”Los que mandan mandan mandando.” Beautiful poetry. Mandan means commanding. The dominant groups, the rulers, command commanding. Mandan mandando. Commanding is understood as domination. But, said Subcommandante Marcos, for us, for the Indians, the person that is commanding is obedient to the people. So, Marcos said : “Los que mandan mandan obendenciendo.”
For me that was... [Dussel flicks his hand, and says] Pphm! A theoretical bomb! Because in modernity, from Hobbes until now, power is a type of domination. In political science, from Weber to Marx to Lenin in “State and Revolution”, the left in general has thought that political power is domination. Because of that understanding, Marx said that the state is not the solution after the revolution, but the finishing or the end of politics is. Why? Because politics is domination. That is the position of anarchism. If political power is domination, then the people can never take power. Because they do not want to dominate the other.
We need a positive definition of political power.
This hypothesis, the Zapatista hypothesis, changes the definition of power, and changes the definition of all politics. You see, power can be fetishized, it can be self-referential. But I need to think at which level: At the level of the institution!
I then begin to make a distinction between potentia and potestas. I take this from Spinoza, from Negri. But I changed the definition, because I need to arrive at a positive vision of politics. And not to be an idealist or moralist, because my position is a critical realism. I am not a moralist who thinks politics is very beautiful. No, I say in the majority of cases politics becomes dominating, and fetishized. But it is a negative possibility, you know–the nature of the power.
And with this hypothesis, I can begin to understand what power is. I began to speak of it in the “Twenty Theses on Politics”. But that was after 10 years of struggle. Because I needed to look at all my books on history. The first volume of my 3-volume world philosophy book was a rereading of the history of politics. And in this rereading, I began to reread the text and see the mistakes within this history. This history was not a history. No, I understood the meaning of power in history, and I needed a new vision of a question, of power–a positive vision.
And this vision is... Die Welt ist Wille. A beautiful expression by Schopenhauer, but not with the same meaning that Schopenhauer had. The expression is “a will to live.” It is very positive. That is the force of power. It is the will to live of the people. And this concept is in the Indian civilization. In all civilizations. Life is the central moment of all cultures. The most mythical and primitive gift, that the Gods give us, is life.
And life is the only absolute moment in all ethical and political description. I have a universal principal: The affirmation of life. I am not postmodern with a fragmentary rationality. No. I think the affirmation of life is necessary for all humanity. Without the affirmation of life we are finished, no? But it is not only affirmation. Where the will is, is the consensus of practical reason. I am not irrational, I think reason is very important. And, it can be universal too. That means it the community is in agreement about this question: How do we affirm life?
But the third element, that is fundamental, is feasibility. Because the Frankfurt School criticizes instrumental reason. But I need instrumental reason, because people, without technology, wealth, a good economy, have no power. So I am a realist, critical, positive. But afterwards, when this community organizes with force and power, and produces the institutions they have, they begin to do this...
For the left, institutions, like power, are thought as oppressive. I say the institution is ambiguous. It can be oppressive, but it can also be an affirmation of life. Agriculture is one institution. I need agriculture to grow, to eat different plants, it is good for life. Agriculture is an institution. Agriculture opens up the possibility that the owner exploits the worker. But it also opens up the possibility for the affirmation of life. Thus, it is ambiguous. It is not intrinsically bad or evil. In my second volume of “The Politics of Liberation”, in more than a 100 pages, I speak on this ambiguity of institutions. I say, the institution can become oppressive when it is fetishized, but at the moment of creation–new institutions–the institution is liberating. At the beginning, a system gives people the possibility to live. Afterwards it becomes oppressive, when it becomes a bureaucracy, when it becomes fetishized and self-referential, persisting for the sake of persisting.
So with this vision of institutions, I can describe different types of institutions. I have a description of all possible political institutions. So about life in the economy, education, culture, etc., and the manner in which it is reproduced. And also the institution that is meant to legitimize the system, i.e. the question of democracy.
After the question of the institution, there is the question of the feasibility of the system: Of technology, economics, etc.
And then, there is a third level. That is, the subjective, principal, normative level, that obliges me to affirm life. Taking a consensus not through violence but through reason, and doing the possible, not the impossible. This is based on subjective, normative principals... It is normative because the ethics in politics is transformed into something political. So, in general, political science of the political faculty speaks on the history of institutions. But it never speaks on subjective, normative principals. Because that is a philosophical question, not a political science question. Democracy is only a procedure of institutions. But at a cultural, subjective level, the agreement of a person with the institution is based on the belief that the masses always make a decision after a consensus based on the semiotic participation of the affected.
That is a subjective culture.
I think democracy is objective, and the latter is subjective. I do a description of almost all ideal systems of politics. It is not ideal in the sense of Plato. It is the actual system in their best aspects. And that is the second volume [of Dussel's three-part “Politics of Liberation”, which lays out a decolonized political philosophy]. And in the third volume, that is in thesis 11-20 [in Dussel's “Twenty Theses on Politics”], I begin a new time period, and I say that the old system cannot be perfect. Because of the human condition, the old system always produces negative effects. The persons that suffer the negative effects–I will use Walter Benjamin and call them the victims–see the system as unjust. From the point of view of the victims, the system is unjust.
Now, lets take a situation where all the participants have a justice claim... I can have a justice claim, but commit an unjust act, because I do not know the negative effect. But the others, who suffer from my action that I committed with my justice claim, suffers from my act. He says to me, “Yes, you have a justice claim, but I suffered from your act.” So I see it as unjust. I see the injustice of my act, in the negative effect of the other. So, it is from this point of view of the other, that I have deconstructed the entire system. Because, now the political action must begin with a liberation praxis to change the system. That is, the revolution of the transformation. It is liberation praxis. I need to change all types of institutions.
I have new principals, subjective ones, that are not systems that allow the reproduction of the existing system, but new subjective normative principals that oblige me to change the system. To do a new better. And these are critical normative principals. That is the second part.
With this type of description of politics, I gave courses to, for example, the Indians in Bolivia. I said that is the reality, and they said, “Very interesting!”
They understood it very well. They said, ”Help us in our action.”
And I can explain that in that group, the people understood what politics means. It comes from our experience. And I see in contact with the people how effective this comprehension is. Because the people understand that they are the only siege around power. All institutions, the president, the deputy, the governor, the military. All these people exercise power as delegation, as my delegation. But they are not power. I am the only subject.
When the people understand that, it changes everything.
And that comes from practice. I do not think there is any philosopher in Europe or the United States who expresses all that in such a manner: It is my practice with the people.
I am in exile because the military of Argentina exiled me. But in Venezuela, I gave lectures in the military school. Hundreds and thousands of students in the military spoke with me about strategy and politics, and they were all very enthusiastic. It was effective. And, I cannot take up the questions of any philosopher in the United States or Europe. Though, it is true I am in dialogue with almost all the actual political philosophers in Europe and United States.
MA: You just mentioned a moment ago that a lot of your work is based on a dialogue with the people. Could you speak a little bit about the origins of the ethics and politics of liberation, and of course liberation theology? Could you say a little about the origins of both in Latin America and in relation to your own activism?
ED: It is interesting I have here one book by Ali Akbar Engineer. He is an Islamic thinker in Bombay, and he has an Islamic theology of liberation.
It is exactly like in Latin America. It was Latin American. The theology of liberation was born more or less at the same time as the philosophy of liberation. In 1968. The reading of Marcuse, the Frankfurt School, but more than that, the Cuban revolution, Che Guevara, Camillo Torres, who was a priest who later died in Colombia, were important. The Christian Youth People in the university. Many of them became guerrillas in the 1960s and they gave their life, and many of them were killed. So in these groups, as Christians, and I could say as Islamists, they began to rethink their own tradition. The interesting thing in the theology of liberation was that it was related with Marxism. There are not many Islamic groups that have gone this way. They have gone towards a more fundamentalist, and traditional thinking. In Latin America, the theology of liberation was democratic. First, Christian democrats means capitalists. But these young people read Marx, so there was first a reconciliation between Christianity and Marxism. But it is also interesting that Walter Benjamin, the German philosopher in aesthetics, Jewish, who spoke of a solution as a materialist messianisme. He combined Marxism with Judaism, exactly the same intuition that underpins the theology of liberation.
It was interesting because the theology of liberation was not a product of the academy. It did not come because the theological faculty was persecuted. It was a product of a popular movement. A struggle against the military and a left consciousness. It was not fundamentalist, it was democratic. It was Marxist in its interpretation and very articulate with the popular imaginary, i.e. a religious imaginary. In Latin America and in the Islamic World too, the popular imaginary is religious. In all the world, and especially the periphery. The interesting thing in the theology of liberation was that within the church it was a critique. It was not that it was from the church, but that it was a critique of the church. Especially a critique against the Eurocentric vision of the Vatican in Italy. That too was critical in relation to the bourgeoisie. It was very easy to understand for the people. The theology of liberation in Latin America was a novelty in world history, because it was the first religious movement that was democratic, left, and against capitalism.
The philosophy of liberation arose in the same moment, with the same experience, but was discovered within the philosophical faculty. I was a professor in philosophy. I am a doctor in philosophy. At that moment I started to, not as a priest but as a philosopher, to study theology, in Paris and in Germany. I did a semester of theology. I know theology academically. I studied in Hebrew because I was in Israel so I speak Hebrew. I can read the Bible in Hebrew. So I have a theological formation, but not as a priest, or as a member of the bureaucracy in the Church, but as a professor in philosophy.
So I developed a philosophy of liberation that was not a theology. Though, I also knew the theology of liberation.
It is easier when I speak to poor people, Indian, Afro, or other popular groups, on the theology of liberation rather than the philosophy of liberation. Because the people know, recognize, this language.
I say, ”You know Moses?”
“He was in Egypt?”
“In Egypt there were slaves.”
They say this, they recognize this, because they know and recognize Christian thought.
Like in Islam, I can say: “You know that Hebrew people were slaves in Egypt?” All people know this as a part of their culture. So I can say, by God, there was the Pharaoh, because he believed he was God. It was idolatry, and God called on the slaves to leave Egypt. But for that, the people had to struggle. They had to give their blood. And the blood of the people arrived at the Nile as a social movement. And then the Pharaoh said, “Go out!” And the people went and founded a new society. And the people know that. We can say, good it is safe for you now like it was then. Mexico is like Egypt and you are a slave here. We must make a new Mexico. Read the text, it is holy for them. And they say, ”Yes, it's true. That is what the text says.” It is easier, that way to begin to analyze the system of oppression.
MA: So it's an imaginary that they share?
ED: Exactly! It is the symbolic language of the imaginary of the people. Theology is easier for the people.
But the philosophy of liberation goes deeper. Because we must think of the foundational moment. We must confront European philosophy and destroy its false arguments. But I do not have any problems in my text. There is nothing on theology, it is pure philosophy. I do not need any faith to understand what is said. But if a person has a faith, Christian or Islamic they can understand it too because my thought is Semitic.
Take my first book, that I wrote many years ago: “Semitic Humanism”. For me, Semitic is Babylon, Phoenician, Palestinian, Hebrew, Christian, and Islamic. I have a chapter on Islam. But I say I will speak on the Semitic vision of the human as a philosopher. Not as a believer. I speak on, for example, anthropological unity and ethics. Also in Islam, they think of the unity of the flesh: Head, soul and body. Unity.
I speak of intersubjectivity in the community and in Islam–in the Ummah. There is no individualism, there is community. After that, temporality is not a circular temporality, but a linear temporality, because I don't just study Babylonia, Christianity, but Islam. And I say, in the beginning, that I studied that because this tradition is part of the Latin American imaginary. So I write thus as a Latin American philosopher, not as a theologian.
At this time I was at the European Institute in Mainz, and I wrote this in Germany while I was there.
Let me quote from the book. “This work expresses the different moments of the constitution of one philosophical anthropology, the human being and the world.”
It is not theology. I speak of the symbols of a culture, of hermeneutics. In the second part you can read about Hellenistic humanism, because I ask: What happened with the vision of Greek philosophy?
The third book looks at the presence of Hellenism in Semitic vision. And it was a question of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th century until the 14th century. The development of that, until the discovery of America. And after that, I begin the history of Latin America, because I have a vision of a world history that is philosophical, not theological. But, I can do theology, which means I can go into a community or in a church of Christians and say, “We are believers and in our text I can speak as a believer.” And in this moment, I do theology.
But in the faculty of philosophy, I never do that. One of my students said to me, “Why are you speaking on theology?” But I've never spoken on theology! And they do not know my faith or non-faith. I said it has nothing to do with that. I can play tennis, and I can have a Christian or Jewish faith, but that has nothing to do with philosophy.
Enrique Dussel is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Iztapalapa campus of the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (Autonomous Metropolitan University, UAM) and also teaches courses at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM). He is also considered one of the founding fathers of the Philosophy of Liberation.
Mahvish Ahmad is an independent journalist and lecturer living and working in Islamabad, Pakistan. She is also the co-founder and editor-in-chief of Tanqeed | a magazine of politics and culture.